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1. INTRODUCTION
Concepts and meaning are fundamental components of nearly all aspects of human cognition. We use
this knowledge every day to recognize entities and objects in our environment, anticipate how they will
behave and interact with each other, use them to perform functions, to generate expectancies for
situations, and to interpret language. This general knowledge of meaning falls within the realm of
semantic memory. For many years, semantic memory was viewed as an amodal, modular memory store
for factual information about concepts, distinct from episodic memory (our memory for specific
instances of personal experience). However, researchers now interpret semantic memory more broadly
to refer to general world knowledge, entangled in experience, and dependent on culture. Furthermore,
there is now considerable evidence suggesting that semantic memory is grounded in the sensory
modalities, is distributed across brain regions, and depends on episodic memories at least in terms of
learning, with the possibility that there is no definite line between episodic and semantic memory. In
this chapter, we review contemporary research in semantic memory. We limit our discussion to lexical
semantics (the meaning of individual words), with particular focus on recent findings and trends,
formal computational models, neural organization, and future directions.
1.1. Classic View of Semantic Memory
Tulving (1972) viewed memory as a system of independent modules. Long-term memory was
subdivided into declarative (facts) and procedural (skills) components. Declarative memory was further
divided into semantic memory and episodic memory, with a clear distinction between them. Tulving
characterized semantic memory as amodal. In an amodal view, when one thinks of an apple, the
information retrieved from semantic memory is independent of the sensory modalities used to perceive
an apple. Although semantic memory contains factual information about an apple’s color and taste, this
information is dissociated from the sensory systems used to actually see or taste.
Early neuropsychological evidence supported Tulving’s (1972) view. For example, amnesic
patients showed dissociations between episodic and semantic memory tasks (Squire, 1988); their
impairment seemed to have little effect on semantic memory despite profound episodic deficiencies,
bolstering the modularity claim. Research on ‘schema abstraction’ tasks found that the decay of
episodic and semantic memory followed different profiles (Posner & Keele, 1968). Although memory
for episodes is stronger than for category prototypes immediately after training, episodic memory
decays much faster than semantic memory (or at least, instances decay faster than do abstract
prototypes).
Tulving’s (1972) characterization of semantic memory as an amodal, modular system separate
from episodic and procedural memory provided a useful foundation to study and understand human
semantic representations. In retrospect, however, it may have actually stifled research in semantics by
imposing a rigid framework that is unlikely to be correct. Recent research with improved experimental,
computational, and neuroimaging techniques clearly contradicts the classic view. Semantic memory is
now viewed more broadly as a part of an integrated memory system, grounded in the sensory,
perceptual, and motor systems, and is distributed across key brain regions.
2. GROUNDING SEMANTIC MEMORY
Tulving’s classic view of semantic memory as an amodal symbolic store has been challenged by
contemporary research. There is a growing body of behavioral and neuroimaging research
demonstrating that when humans access word meaning, they automatically activate sensorimotor
information used to perceive and act on the real-world objects and relations to which a word refers. In
theories of grounded cognition, the meaning of a word is grounded in the sensorimotor systems
(Barsalou, 1999; see Pecher & Zwann, 2005, for a review). Hence, when one thinks of an apple,
knowledge regarding motoric grasping, chewing, sights, sounds, and tastes used to encode episodic
experiences of an apple are reinstated via sensorimotor simulation. Thus, a grounded simulation refers
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to context-specific re-activations that incorporate the important aspects of episodic experience into a
current representation. In this sense, simulations are guided and only partial (Barsalou, 2008). This
approach challenges amodal views, and makes a clear link between episodic experience and semantic
memory.
A wealth of recent behavioral evidence supports the grounded simulation approach to semantics.
For example, response latencies for images and feature names are faster when they have visual
properties congruent with context (Solomon & Barsalou, 2001; Zwann, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002).
Similarly, having participants perform particular motions (e.g., grasping) facilitates the comprehension
of sentences describing actions involving these motions (Klatzky et al., 1989), and prime-target pairs
sharing motor-manipulation features (e.g., typewriter-piano) are responded to more quickly than pairs
that do not (Myun, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2006). Zwann and Madden (2005) review numerous studies
suggesting that the mental representations activated during comprehension also include information
about object features, temporal and spatial perspective, and spatial iconicity. Barsalou (2008) and
Pecher, Boot, and Van Danzig (2011) contain surveys of the recent literature attesting to the
importance of situation models, simulation (perceptual, motor, and affective), and gesture in language
comprehension and abstract concepts.
3. SEMANTIC ORGANIZATION IN THE BRAIN
Semantic memory research was for many years dominated by cognitive psychologists who generally
were not concerned with neural organization. In cognitive neuropsychology, there is a history of studies
investigating patients with semantic deficits (Warrington & Shallice, 1984). However, for a number of
years, this line of research was divorced from semantic memory research using normal adult
participants. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, fMRI in particular, research on the neural
organization of semantic memory blossomed.
Researchers have long known that brain regions responsible for perception tend to be specialized
for specific sensory modalities. Given that perception is distributed across specialized neural regions,
one possibility is that conceptual representations are organized in a similar fashion. For the past 40
years, Paivio (1971) has advocated a form of modality-specific representations in his dual-coding
theory. Furthermore, studies of patients with category-specific semantic deficits have been used as a
basis for arguing for multimodal representations for the past 25 years or so. In early work, Warrington
and McCarthy (1987) put forward their sensory/functional theory to account for patterns of category
specific impairments of knowledge in patients with focal brain damage. The basic assumption is that
living things depend primarily on visual knowledge, whereas although visual knowledge is also
important for nonliving things, knowledge of an object’s function is primary. Building on Allport
(1985), recent research has used analyses of large scale feature production norms to extend the sensoryfunctional theory to other senses and types of knowledge, and move beyond the binary living-nonliving
distinction (Cree & McRae, 2003). There do remain some accounts of category-specific semantic
deficits that are amodal (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998, Tyler & Moss, 2001), but even these researchers
have begun to find support for theories in which knowledge is tied to modality-specific brain areas
(Mahon & Caramazza, 2003; Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009).
The behavioral and neuropsychological evidence in favor of grounded semantics is corroborated
by recent neuroimaging studies supporting a distributed multimodal system. A few researchers have
used evoked response potentials to investigate this issue (Sitnikova, West, Kuperberg, & Holcomb,
2006), but the vast majority of studies have used fMRI. For example, Goldberg, Perfetti, and Schneider
(2006) tied together previously reported neuroimaging evidence supporting modally bound tactile,
colour, auditory, and gustatory representations. They found that sensory brain areas for each modality
are recruited during a feature verification task using linguistic stimuli (e.g., banana-yellow). The same
pattern emerges in single word processing. Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) showed that
reading action words correlates with activation in somatotopically corresponding areas of the motor
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cortex (lick activates tongue regions while kick activates foot regions), indicating that word meaning is
modally distributed across brain regions. Furthermore, within brain regions that encode modalityspecific, possibly feature-based representations, some studies suggest a category-based organization
(Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999). Finally, some studies have shown that semantic representations are
located just anterior to primary perceptual or motor areas, whereas others have found evidence for
activation of primary areas (see Thompson-Schill, 2003). In summary, there is a large amount of
converging evidence supporting a distributed multimodal semantic system (for thorough reviews, see
Binder, 2009; Martin, 2007).
Perhaps one the most important remaining issues concerns the fact that people’s concepts are not
experienced as a jumble of features, disjointed across space and time, but instead are experienced as
coherent unified wholes. Multimodal feature-based theories therefore need to include a solution to the
binding problem, specifying how representational elements are integrated into conceptual wholes, both
within and between modalities. One solution involves temporal synchrony of neuronal firing rates (von
der Malsburg, 1999). Semantic representations may be integrated by coincidental firing rates of
distributed neural populations. However, the most frequently invoked solution is based on the idea of a
convergence zone, which can be considered as a set of processing units that encode coincidental
activity among multiple input units (Damasio, 1989). In connectionist models, a convergence zone may
be thought of as a hidden layer (Rogers et al., 2004). Because they encode time-locked activation
patterns, an important property of convergence zones is that they transform their input, rather than just
repeat signals. In this way, successive convergence zones build more complex or abstract
representations. Current theories of multimodal semantic representations incorporate either single
convergence zones, as in Patterson, Nestor, and Rogers’ (2007) anterior temporal lobe hub theory, or a
hierarchy of convergence zones encoding information over successively more complex configurations
of modalities (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). At the moment, it is unclear which of these hypotheses is
correct.
In summary, recent research supports the idea that semantic representations are grounded across
modality-specific brain regions. Researchers are working toward fleshing out details of precisely what
these regions encode, the degree to which sub-regions are specific to types of concepts, and how
semantic representations are experienced as unified wholes. Furthermore, the vast majority of research
has been conducted on concrete concepts, so research on other concepts, such as verbs or abstract
concepts, will play a key role over the next few years.
4. EVENT-BASED SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS
Another way in which the semantic-episodic distinction has been blurred in recent years concerns
research on event-based knowledge in semantic memory. People’s knowledge of common everyday
events includes actions that are part of those events, and common primary participants or components,
such as agents (the people doing the action), patients (the people or objects upon which the action is
performed), instruments involved in actions, and locations at which various events take part.
Furthermore, people have knowledge of temporal aspects of events. This generalized event knowledge
is learned through our experience with everyday events, watching television and movies, and reading
and hearing about what people have done, what they are doing, and what they are going to do.
Language provides many cues into event knowledge. For example, verbs like travel or cook denote
events and actions, some nouns like breakfast refer to events, and other nouns refer to entities or
objects that typically play a role in specific situations, such as waitress, customer, fork, or cafeteria. A
number of studies have shown that such event knowledge is computed rapidly from single words.
These experiments have tended to use a priming paradigm with a short stimulus onset asynchony
(SOA: the time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target), which is viewed as
providing a window into the organization of semantic memory.
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Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, and Marslen-Wilson (1995) showed priming effects based on instrument
relations (such as broom-floor) and what they called script relations, in which the primes were a
mixture of events and locations (hospital-doctor and war-army). Subsequent studies have shown that
verbs prime their typical agents (arresting-cop), patients (serving-customer), and instruments (stirredspoon), but not locations (skated-arena; Ferretti, McRae, & Hatherell, 2001). Furthermore, typical
agents, patients, instruments, and locations prime verbs (McRae, Hare, Elman, & Ferretti, 2005). In
addition, Hare, Jones, Thomson, Kelly, and McRae (2009) showed that event nouns prime the types of
people and things commonly found at those events (sale-shopper, breakfast-eggs), location nouns
prime entities and objects typically found at those locations (stable-horse, sandbox-shovel), and
instrument nouns prime the types of things on which they typically are used (key-door) but not the
people who typically use them (hose-gardener, although priming was found in the other direction).
Hare et al. used a corpus-based model, BEAGLE (Jones, Kintsch, & Mewhort, 2006) to simulate their
results.
Chwilla and Kolk (2005) showed that people can integrate words rapidly to construct situations,
thus producing priming. They presented two words simultaneously that were unrelated except when
considered in the context of some broader event (director bribe), and demonstrated priming of a third
word (dismissal) related to the situation. Chwilla and Kolk’s results depend on conceptually integrating
both primes with the target, thus speaking to rapid activation of knowledge of situations. In addition,
Khalkhali, Wammes, and McRae (2011) found that relatedness decision latencies were shorter when
three events were presented in the order corresponding to their usual real-world sequence (marinategrill-chew) than when the order of the first two events was reversed (grill-marinate-chew), suggesting
that such temporal information is encoded in semantic memory.
An interesting consequence of these studies is that they move toward a stronger tie between
semantic memory and sentence comprehension. For example, a number of the studies used thematic
roles of verbs as the basis for testing relations, thus making direct contact with a key construct in
sentence processing research. Along this same line, Jones and Love (2007) provide a point of contact
between sentence processing and how people learn lexical concepts. Participants studied sentences
such as The polar bear chases the seal and The German shepherd chases the cat. In a test phase,
similarity ratings for entities and objects participating in common relational systems increased. The
increase was largest for objects playing the same role within a relation (e.g., the chaser), but also was
present for those playing different roles in the same relation (e.g., the chaser or the chasee role in the
chase relation), and this happened regardless of whether they participated in the same sentence/event.
In summary, recent studies have investigated people’s episodic-based knowledge of common
generalized events. These studies show that semantic memory is organized so that this knowledge is
computed and used rapidly, and they demonstrate direct links between episodic and semantic memory.
5. SEMANTIC AND ASSOCIATIVE RELATIONS
There are longstanding issues in semantic memory research regarding associative versus semantic
relations. Association has a long history in psychology and philosophy, and normative word association
has often been used to explain performance in semantic memory experiments (Nelson, McEvoy, &
Dennis, 2000; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Bower (2000) defined associations as
“sensations that are experienced contiguously in time and/or space. The memory that sensory quality or
event A was experienced together with, or immediately preceding, sensory quality or event B is
recorded in the memory bank as an association from idea a to idea b." (p. 3). In 1965, Deese stated that
“almost all the basic propositions of current association theory derive from the sequential nature of
events in human experience” (p. 1). More recently, Moss et al. (1995) claimed that associations
between words are “built up through repeated co-occurrence of the two word forms.” (p. 864). In
general, the consensus seems to be that contiguity is key to forming a link between two concepts.
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In contrast, association in cognitive psychology almost invariably is defined in terms of its
operationalization. In a word association task, a participant hears or reads a stimulus word and
produces the first word that comes to mind (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). Thus, two words are
associated if one is produced as a response to the other. There exist significant discrepancies between
the definition of association and its operationalization. Association is learning-based whereas word
association is production-based. Association is based on sensory information whereas word association
is linguistically-based. Association is based on contiguity, whereas word associations are virtually
always meaningful.
The construct of semantic relatedness was for a long time limited to exemplars from the same
category, or featurally-similar concepts (as in cow-horse; Lupker, 1984; Frenck-Mestre & Bueno,
1999). Recently, however, researchers have investigated a much wider array of relations. The eventbased relations discussed in Section 4 are examples. In addition, researchers have been studying what
are often called thematic relations (see Estes, Golonka, & Jones, 2011, for a recent review). These
include, for example, cow-milk, where a cow produces milk, or wind-erosion, where wind causes
erosion.
A thorny issue concerns delineating between the influences of semantic and associative
relatedness. Lucas (2000) concluded from a meta-analysis of priming experiments that “pure” semantic
priming (in the absence of word association) exists, whereas there is no evidence for association-based
priming in the absence of semantic relatedness. In contrast, Hutchinson (2003) reviewed individual
studies and concluded that both semantic and associative relatedness produce priming. One possibility
is that it may not be fruitful to distinguish between associative and semantic relations because word
associations are best understood in terms of semantic relations (Anisfeld & Knapp, 1968; Brainerd et
al., 2008). In some views, the word association task unambiguously taps associative connections
between words/concepts in people’s semantic memory. In contrast, word association can be considered
an open-ended task on which performance is driven almost exclusively by types of semantic relations.
Researchers who have classified word associates according to their semantic relations have shown that
almost all stimulus-response pairs, with the exception of rhymes, have clear semantic relations (Guida
& Lenci, 2007). Furthermore, Brainerd et al. found that a number of semantic variables correlate with
word association strength.
This is likely the primary reason why it has been so difficult to distinguish empirically between
associative and semantic relations. In studies of associative priming, the items are a mixture of
semantic relations, such as hammer-nail or engine-car. McNamara (2005) stated the issue clearly:
“Having devoted a fair amount of time perusing free-association norms, I challenge anyone to find two
highly associated words that are not semantically related in some plausible way. Under this view, the
distinction between purely semantically and associatively related words is an artificial categorization of
an underlying continuum.” (p. 86). Furthermore, in studies of pure semantic relatedness priming, items
that appear in word association norms are excluded. However, it does not appear to make sense to
argue that items in these studies are not associated in the general sense. For example, Hare et al. (2009)
analyzed subsets of stimuli not associated according to word association norms, showing priming in the
absence of association. This logic appears at first glance to be valid because concepts such as sale and
shopper are not associated according to Nelson et al.’s (1998) norms. However, shoppers are found at
sales, and the entire point of a sale is to attract shoppers. So, these concepts definitely are associated in
the general sense, even though forward and backward association statistics indicate that they are not.
The line between association and semantics has now been questioned in a number of areas of
research. McRae, Khalkhali, and Hare (in press) discuss this issue with respect to research using the
Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm, picture-word facilitation and interference, the
development of associative learning through adolescence, and semantic priming. Although association
is a critical aspect of learning, one possibility is that virtually all retained associations are meaningful
and thus can be understood in terms of semantic relations. On the other hand, given longstanding views
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on the primacy of association-based links in memory (as indexed by normative word association), this
debate is likely to continue.
6. ABSTRACT CONCEPTS
The structure and content of abstract concepts such as lucky, advise, and boredom have been studied to
a much lesser extent than have concrete concepts, and thus are not nearly as well understood. In
general, there is little consensus regarding how abstract concepts are represented and computed. The
lack of obvious physical referents in the world for abstract concepts makes theorizing, model building,
and experiment quite difficult, but also an important and intriguing issue. We use the phrase “obvious
physical referents” in the previous sentence because many abstract concepts are at least partly
experienced by the senses, or have internal states that correspond to them. For example, we have all
experienced boredom, we have internal thoughts and emotions that are tied to the meaning of boredom,
and we can visually recognize boredom in other people.
The most influential theory has been Paivio’s (1971; 2007) dual-coding theory, in which the
processing of lexical concepts involves the activation of functionally independent but interconnected
verbal and nonverbal representational systems. The verbal system consists of associatively
interconnected linguistically-based units, whereas the nonverbal system consists of spatially-organized
representations of objects and events that can be experienced as mental images. Activation spreads
within and between systems. Concrete concepts are represented in both systems, whereas abstract
concepts are represented in the verbal system only. Dual-coding theory has been used to explain
differences between concrete and abstract words in memory tasks, lexical decision, EEG, and fMRI
experiments.
Dual-coding theory is contrasted frequently with context-availability theory, in which the major
difference between abstract and concrete concepts is that abstract words and sentences are more
difficult to comprehend because it is challenging to access relevant world knowledge contextual
information when comprehending abstract materials (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). At present,
however, dual-coding theory has received much more support.
The vast majority of experiments on abstract concepts compare performance on concrete versus
abstract words, either in isolation or in sentence contexts. A consistent finding is that memory is better
for concrete concepts (Paivio, 2007). A number of studies have also found shorter lexical decision
latencies to concrete than to abstract words in isolation (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983), and a larger
N400 to concrete words (Kounios & Holcomb, 1994). Some patients have been reported with better
performance on concrete concepts (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall, 1980). However, a frustrating
aspect of this research is that, although the memory results are stable, some studies show shorter lexical
decision latencies to abstract words (Kousta et al., 2011), and some patients perform better on abstract
concepts (Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994). In addition, there is no compelling explanation for the
N400 results. Finally, the fMRI literature on concrete versus abstract concepts has produced highly
variable results (Grossman et al., 2002; Kiehl et al., 1999; Wise et al., 2000).
There are at least two reasons for the inconsistency in results. First, some differences may be task
related because the manner in which people process words influences the form of concrete-abstract
differences. Second, there may be important differences among item sets across studies. Typically,
researchers select concrete and abstract words using concreteness and/or imageability ratings.
However, the categories of concrete and abstract concepts are large, and selecting small subsets from
these large classes has presumably led to inconsistent results. To deal with this issue, researchers have
begun to classify abstract words on further dimensions, such as emotional valence (Kousta et al., 2011).
More recent theories of the structure and content of abstract concepts have emerged. In Barsalou’s
(1999) perceptual simulation theory, abstract and concrete concepts can be simulated from prior
experience. One issue involves the type of simulations that might be key to abstract concepts that do
not, at least at first glance, have sensory-motor correspondences. Barsalou and Weimer-Hastings
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(2005) focused on situations as the key to abstract concepts. Concepts such as lucky, advise, and
boredom are tied both to situations in which people have learned the meaning of those concepts, and to
internally generated cognitive and emotional states. At present, however, little research has been
conducted to flesh out these ideas.
One other prominent theory of abstract concepts is conceptual metaphor or image schema theory
(Lakoff, 1987). In this view, abstract concepts are mapped to sensory-motor grounded image schemas.
For example, studies suggest that the abstract concept of time is grounded in our knowledge of space
(Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). At the moment, however, the notion of a conceptual metaphor or
image schema is inconsistent among theorists (Pecher et al., 2011).
A promising avenue for studying abstract concepts comes from corpus-based distributional
models. One advantage of corpus-based models is that they provide representations for all types of
words using the same computational mechanisms. As described in Section 7.3, these models can also
be combined with other approaches to form hybrids.
In summary, understanding the organization and content of abstract concepts is a major challenge
for all current theories of semantic memory. Addressing the relevant issues will require a deeper
appreciation of the similarities and differences among types of abstract concepts, how abstract concepts
depend differentially on sensory, motor, and internally-generated cognition and emotional information,
and the degree to which they are tied to situations or contexts in which they are important.
7. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SEMANTIC MEMORY
There is a fuzzy boundary in the literature between models of semantic processing and semantic
representation. We define the former to be models of how learned semantic structure is used in tasks,
and the latter to be models that specify a mechanism by which semantic memory is formed from
experience. We first review models of semantic processing, and then models of learning semantic
structure from experience (primarily corpus-based models). However, we acknowledge that this
distinction between the two ‘levels’ of models is an oversimplification: How we learn new semantic
information depends on the current contents of semantic memory, and semantic structure and process
influence each other when explaining behavioral data (Johns & Jones, 2010).
7.1. Models of Semantic Processing
Connectionist networks have been used to provide insight into how word meaning is represented
and computed, and to simulate numerous empirical semantic memory phenomena. In these models,
concepts are typically represented as distributed patterns of activity across sets of representational units
that often represent features (<has 4 legs>), but not necessarily nameable ones. Units are organized into
layers, and are connected by weighted connections. These connections control processing, and their
weights are established using a learning algorithm.
The impact of connectionist models has been at least four-fold. First, due to distributed
representations, they naturally encode concept similarity in terms of shared units, and thus simulate
similarity-based phenomena (Cree et al., 1999; Masson, 1995; Plaut & Booth, 2000). Second, because
they learn statistical regularities between and within patterns, they have led researchers to focus on the
distributional statistics underlying semantic representations and computations (Tyler & Moss, 2001;
McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997). Third, because many connectionist models settle into
representations over time (e.g., attractor networks), they can be used to simulate response latencies, and
provide insight into the temporal dynamics of computing word meaning (Masson, 1995). Fourth, one
can train a model and then damage it in various ways, thus simulating brain-damaged patients (Hinton
& Shallice, 1991; Plaut & Shallice, 1993; Rogers et al., 2004). Finally, all of these properties of
connectionist models are interrelated.
Semantic processing unfolds over time. When we read or hear a word, components of meaning
become active at different rates over the first several hundred milliseconds. Attractor networks, in
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which units update their states continuously based on both their prior states and input from other units,
are well suited to simulate this process. Because priming has played such a large role in semantic
memory research, a number of researchers have simulated it. Given that similar concepts have
overlapping distributed representations, connectionist networks have been successful at simulating
priming between featurally-similar concepts such as eagle and hawk, providing insight into factors such
as correlations among semantic features and the degree of similarity between concepts (Cree et al.,
1999; McRae et al., 1997). Furthermore, researchers have simulated contiguity-based (associative)
priming, and individual differences in priming (Masson, 1995; Plaut & Booth, 2000).
One way in which distributional statistics underlying semantic representations have been studied is
the feature verification task, in which participants judge whether a feature such as <has an engine> is
reasonably true of a concept such as van. These studies and accompanying simulations have
highlighted the role of correlational structure. That is, some features tend to occur with others across
basic-level concepts, such as <has feathers> and <has a beak>, and there is a continuum of the feature
correlational strength. Studies such as McRae et al. (1997) and Randall et al. (2004) show that
connectionist models predict influences of feature correlations that are observed in human data.
Furthermore, the degree to which features are distinctive (the inverse of the number of concepts in
which a feature occurs) plays a privileged role in semantic computations in both people and
connectionist simulations (Cree et al., 2006; Randall et al., 2004). Distributional statistics such as these
are bases for theories such as the conceptual structure account (Tyler & Moss, 2001), and are also
strongly implicated in understanding data from category-specific deficits and semantic dementia
patients (Rogers et al., 2004; Tyler & Moss). Finally, they may form the basis for understanding how
superordinate categories such as clothing and fruit are learned and computed (O’Connor, Cree, &
McRae, 2009).
Much of the research on simulating neurally-impaired adults has drawn on work by Hinton and
Shallice (1993) and Plaut and Shallice (1993). A nice example is Rogers and colleagues’ work in which
they provide detailed accounts of semantic dementia patients (Rogers et al., 2004; Rogers &
McClelland, 2004). Rogers et al. damaged a trained attractor network, and then simulated patient
performance in a number of tasks. For example, they showed that loss of knowledge followed a
specific-to-general trajectory because of the nature in which regularities across visual and verbal
patterns are stored in their model’s hidden units. Features that were shared and correlated across
numerous concepts tended to be represented in larger and more neighboring regions of semantic space
than were highly distinctive features. Thus, distinctive features were more likely to be influenced by
damage, so the model showed a tendency to lose its ability to discriminate among similar concepts
early in the course of semantic dementia.
Finally, Rogers and McClelland (2004) present a large set of arguments and simulations in which,
among other things, they provide connectionist accounts of several phenomena that have been
highlighted in knowledge-based theories of concepts. The issues are too complex and numerous to do
them justice in a short paragraph, but their book is highly recommended.
7.2 Models of Semantic Representation
Classic models of semantic structure assumed that meaning was represented either as a hierarchical
network of interconnected nodes (Collins and Quillian, 1969) or as arrays of binary features (Smith,
Shoben, & Rips, 1974). A major limitation of both these early models is that neither specifies how their
representations are learned. Instead, their representations must be hand coded by the researcher or
collected from adult participants.
More recent distributional models specify cognitive mechanisms for constructing semantic
representations from statistical experience with text corpora. In general, these models are all based on
the distributional hypothesis (Harris, 1970): Words that appear in similar linguistic contexts are likely
to have related meanings. For example, apple may frequently co-occur with seed, worm, and core. As a
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result, the model can infer that these words are related. In addition, the model can induce that apple is
similar to peach even if the two never directly co-occur, because they occur around the same types of
words. In contrast, apple and staple rarely appear in the same or similar contexts.
There are a large number of distributional models (for reviews, see Bullinaria & Levy 2007;
Riordan & Jones, 2011). To simplify discussion, we classify them into three families based on their
learning mechanism: 1) latent inference models, 2) passive co-occurrence models, and 3) retrievalbased models. For an in-depth review of new advances in distributional modeling, we refer readers to
the recent pair of special issues of Topics in Cognitive Science, (2011).
7.2.1. Latent Inference Models. This family of models reverse-engineers the cognitive variables
responsible for how words co-occur across linguistic contexts. The process is similar to other types of
latent inference in psychology. For example, personality psychologists commonly administer structured
questionnaires, constructing items to tap hypothetical psychological constructs. Singular value
decomposition (SVD) is applied to the pattern of responses over questionnaire items to infer the latent
psychological variables responsible for the cross-item response patterns. Latent inference models of
semantic memory work in an analogous way, but they apply this decomposition to the pattern of word
co-occurrences over documents in a corpus.
The best-known latent inference model is Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais,
1997). LSA begins with a word-by-document frequency matrix from a text corpus. Each word is
weighted relative to its entropy over documents; ‘promiscuous’ words appearing in many contexts are
dampened more than are ‘monogamous’ words that appear more faithfully in particular contexts.
Finally, the matrix is factored using SVD, and only the components with the largest eigenvalues are
retained (typically 300-400). These are the latent semantic components that best explain how words cooccur over documents, similar to the way that the psychological constructs of introversion and
extroversion might explain response patterns over hundreds of questionnaire items. With this reduced
representation, each word in the corpus is represented as a pattern over latent variables. In the reduced
space, indirect relationships emerge—even though two words may never have directly co-occurred in a
document (e.g., two synonyms), they can have similar patterns.
Landauer and Dumais (1997) suggested that the human brain performs some data reduction
operation similar to SVD on contextual experience to construct semantic representations. However,
they were careful not to claim that what the brain does is exactly SVD on a perfectly remembered itemby-episode representation of experience. Whether or not LSA is a plausible model of human semantic
representation (for criticisms, see Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Perfetti, 1998), it has been remarkably
successful at accounting for data ranging from human performance on synonymy tests (Landauer &
Dumais, 1997) to metaphor comprehension (Kintsch, 2000). LSA set the stage for future distributional
models to better study the specific mechanisms that might produce a reduced semantic space. In
addition, the model made a clear formal link between semantic memory structure and episodic
experience.
More recently, Griffiths, Steyvers, and Tenenbaum’s (2007) Topic model extended LSA in a
Bayesian framework, specifying a generative mechanism by which latent semantic variables could
produce the pattern of word co-occurrences across documents. The Topic model operates on the same
initial data representation as LSA—it assumes that we experience words over discrete episodic contexts
(operationalized as documents in a corpus). However, it specifies a cognitive inference process based
on probabilistic reasoning to discover word meaning. To novice users of semantic models, the
computational machinery of the Topic model can be daunting. However, the theoretical underpinning
of the model is simple and elegant, and is based on the same idea posited for how children infer unseen
causes for observable events. Consider an analogy: Given a set of co-occurring symptoms, a
dermatologist must infer the unseen disease or diseases that led to the observed symptoms. Over many
instances of the same co-occurring symptoms, she can infer the likelihood that they result from a
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common cause. The topic model works in an analogous manner, but on a much larger scale of
inference and with mixtures of causal variables. Given that certain words tend to co-occur in contexts
and this pattern is consistent over many contexts, the model infers the likely latent “topics” that are
responsible for the co-occurrence patterns, where the document is a probabilistic mixture of topics. A
word’s meaning is a probability distribution over possible topics, where a topic is a probability
distribution over words (just as a disease would be a probability distribution over symptoms, and a
symptom is a probability distribution over possible diseases that produced it).
This results in two key distinctions from LSA. First, the Topic model is generative in that it defines
a process by which documents could be constructed from mixtures of mental variables. Second, a
word’s representation is a probability distribution rather than a point in semantic space. This allows the
Topic model to represent multiple meanings of ambiguous words, whereas in LSA, ambiguity is
collapsed to a single point. The Topic model is able to account for free association data, sense
disambiguation, word-prediction, and discourse effects that are problematic for LSA (Griffiths et al.,
2007).
7.2.2. Passive Co-Occurrence Models. Passive co-occurrence models posit simple Hebbian type
accumulation mechanisms that give rise to sophisticated semantic representations. Hence, these models
tend not to need a full word-by-document matrix, but gradually develop semantic structure by simple
co-occurrence “counting” as a text corpus is continuously experienced.
The first passive co-occurrence model was the hyperspace analogue to language model (HAL;
Lund & Burgess, 1996). HAL slides an n-word window across a text corpus, and counts the cooccurrence frequency of words within the window (where frequency is inversely proportionate to
distance between words in the window). A word’s semantic representation is a vector of distanceweighted co-occurrence values to all other words in the corpus. Hence, a word is defined relative to
other words in HAL. Comparing the vectors for two words yields their semantic similarity, producing
both direct and indirect semantic relations as in LSA. HAL has accounted for a range of semantic
priming phenomena (Lund & Burgess, 1996). Modern variants of HAL have improved the model to
produce better fits to human data (Rhode, Gonnerman, & Plaut, 2009), and a HAL-like model was used
by Mitchell et al. (2008) to predicted fMRI activation patterns associated with the meanings of concrete
nouns.
A second type of passive co-occurrence model uses the accumulation of random vectors as a
mechanism for semantic abstraction (Jones, Kintsch, & Mewhort, 2006; Kanerva, 2009). For example,
in the BEAGLE model (Jones & Mewhort, 2007) words are initially represented by random patterns of
arbitrary dimensionality. Hence, before any episodic experience, the representation for apple is no
more similar to peach than it is to staple. As text is experienced, each word’s memory pattern is
updated as the sum of the random initial patterns representing the words with which it co-occurs. Thus,
apple, peach, and core move closer to one another in semantic space as text is experienced, while
staple moves away (but closer to paper, pencil, etc.). Random accumulation can be considered as
semantic abstraction from the coincidental co-occurrence of (initially random) brain states representing
the words in the episodic context. Because of the arbitrary nature of the features, BEAGLE can
simultaneously learn about the positional information of words in the context similar to HAL-type
models (Jones & Mewhort, 2007 use convolution to encode order information). Hence, a word’s
representation becomes a pattern of arbitrary “features” that reflects its history of co-occurrence with,
and position relative to, other words in contexts. BEAGLE simulates a number of phenomena including
semantic priming, typicality, and semantic constraints in sentence completions.
7.2.3. Retrieval-Based Models. Rather than assuming that humans store semantic representations,
retrieval-based models construct meaning as part of episodic memory retrieval. Retrieval-based models
are similar to exemplar-based theories of categorization (Nosofsky, 1986) and multiple-trace theories
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of global memory (Hintzman, 1986). Just as Hintzman’s Minerva 2 model demonstrated that schema
abstraction is simulated by a model containing only episodic traces, Kwantes’ (2005) constructed
semantics model demonstrates that semantic phenomena are possible without requiring a semantic
memory. In this model, memory is the episodic word-by-context matrix. When a word is read or heard,
its semantic representation is constructed as an average of other words in memory, weighted by their
contextual similarity to the target. Although semantic abstraction differs radically from LSA, similar
representations are produced. Dennis (2005) has used a similar approach, accounting for an impressive
array of semantic phenomena.
7.3. Integrating Perceptual Information into Distributional Models
Distributional models have been criticized as psychologically implausible because they learn from only
linguistic information and do not contain information about sensorimotor perception contrary to
grounded cognition (for a review, see de Vega, Glenberg, & Graesser, 2008). Hence, representations in
distributional models are not a replacement for feature norms. Feature-based representations contain a
great deal of sensorimotor features of words that cannot be learned from purely linguistic input, and
both types of information are core to human semantic representation (Louwerse, 2008). Riordan and
Jones (2011) recently compared a variety of feature-based and distributional models on semantic
clustering tasks. Their results demonstrated that whereas there is information about word meaning
redundantly coded in both feature norms and linguistic data, each has its own unique variance and the
two information sources serve as complimentary cues to meaning.
Research using recurrent networks trained on child-directed speech corpora has found that
pretraining a network with features related to children’s sensorimotor experience produced
significantly better word learning when subsequently trained on linguistic data (Howell, Jankowicz, &
Becker, 2005). Durda, Buchanan, and Caron (2009) trained a feedforward network to associate LSAtype semantic vectors with their corresponding activation of features from McRae et al.’s (2005)
norms. Given the semantic representation for dog, the model attempts to activate the output feature
<has fur> and inhibit the output feature for <made of metal>. After training, the network was able to
infer the correct pattern of perceptual features for words that were not used in training because of their
linguistic similarity to words that were used in training.
A recent flurry of models using the Bayesian Topic model framework has also explored parallel
learning of linguistic and featural information (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009; Baroni, Murphy,
Barba, & Poesio, 2010; Steyvers, 2009). Given a word-by-document representation of a text corpus and
a word-by-feature representation of feature production norms, the models learn a word’s meaning by
simultaneously considering inference across documents and features. This enables learning from joint
distributional information: If the model learns from the feature norms that sparrows have beaks, and
from linguistic experience that sparrows and mockingbirds are distributionally similar, it infer that
mockingbirds also have beaks, despite having no feature vector for mockingbird. Integration of
linguistic and sensorimotor information allows the model to better fit human semantic data than a
model trained with only one source (Andrews et al., 2009). This information integration is not unique
to Bayesian models, but can also be accomplished within passive co-occurrence models (Jones &
Recchia, 2010; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004) and retrieval-based models (Johns & Jones,
in press).
8. SUMMARY
Over the past 25 years or so, semantic memory research has blossomed for a number of reasons, all of
which are equally important. The generation of intriguing patient data and theories of the organization
of semantic memory that resulted from them, and the acceptance of this patient research into what
some might call mainstream cognitive psychology, was an important step. Furthermore, connectionist
models of semantic processing enabled implementations of meaning-based computations, generating
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new ideas, experiments, and simulations. The advent of neuroimaging methods allowed researchers to
study semantic processing in the brain, to integrate neurally-based theories with those resulting from
implemented models as well as normal adult and patient data, and to generate novel theories of
semantic representation and processing. In addition, theories of grounded cognition added excitement
and paved the way for a large number of novel experiments designed to test them. Finally, corpusbased models of meaning have provided new ways to think about semantic representations, and a
plethora of new ideas for designing experiments, and techniques for simulating human performance.
The present high level of enthusiasm surrounding the study of semantic memory should continue as
researchers refine, compare, and integrate theories, and test predictions that result from those
theoretical endeavors. We hope that we have communicated some of this excitement to the reader.
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